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Appellants/Cross-Appellees William C. Selvage and Wm. C.
Selvage, Inc. (collectively "Selvage") submit this response to
the Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Sear-Brown Associates,
P.C. and The Sear-Brown Group, Inc. (collectively "Sear-Brown").
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE CONCERNING CROSS-APPEAL
I.

Course of Proceedings.
The trial court directed verdict against defendant J.J.

Johnson & Associates ("Johnson") on Selvage's breach of contract
claims. Instruction No. 22 at R.800.

The jury's answers to

Special Interrogatories found that Sear-Brown was also liable to
Selvage on four independent bases under Utah's Fraudulent
Transfers Act and the "mere instrumentality" doctrine. R.819827.
After trial, Selvage and Sear-Brown submitted, briefed and
argued proposed findings and conclusions.

The lower court's

January 13, 1994 Memorandum Decision (i) specifically adopted the
jury's findings as its own, (ii) concluded that Selvage is
entitled to judgment against Sear-Brown on four independent
grounds of fraudulent transfer and mere instrumentality, and
(iii) awarded Selvage $42,500 in attorneys fees.i;

R.1124-

1133A.
Sear-Brown filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, For a New Trial and to Alter or Amend Judgment.
17

R.113 8-

This award of only 20% of Selvage's attorney's fees is the
subject of Selvage's appeal.

s \alr\56593

1158.

On April 14, 1994 the lower court entered its Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, (i) incorporating its prior
Memorandum Decision, (ii) specifically finding that there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support each of the four
bases of Sear-Brown's liability, (iii) ruling that Selvage's
"insider" preference claim is not time-barred, and (iv) denying
Sear-Brown's motions. R.1290-1294.
On May 23, 1994 the lower court entered its Amended and
Final Judgment in favor of Selvage and against both Sear Brown
and Johnson in the principal amount of $109,400, plus prejudgment
interest of $75,810.73, expenses of $6,433.87, and attorneys'
fees of $42,500, for a total of $234,144.60.
II.

R.1396-1399.

Statement of Facts Concerning Cross-Appeal.
A.

Defendant Johnson.

architectural business. R.12.

Johnson purchased Selvage's
The sale occurred on August 28,

1986 and consisted of three separate agreements (Exhibits 6, 7
and 9).

All three agreements provided for reasonable attorneys

fees.
Selvage commenced this action on April 7, 1987, alleging
that Johnson breached all three contracts, and seeking damages,
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

R.2-82. After four days

of trial, the jury was directed that Johnson is liable under all

s-\alr\56593
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three contracts.-7 R.800.

The jury returned its verdict

through answer to Special Interrogatory No. 1, finding Johnson
liable to Selvage in the principal amount of $109,400.32. R.819.
B.

Defendant Sear-Brown.

Sear-Brown is a national design,

architectural and engineering firm, headquartered in Rochester,
New York.

R.1779, 1780.

In late 1985 and early 1986, Sear-Brown

commenced its relationship with Johnson.

R.1781. At that time,

Sear-Brown was aware that Johnson was in financial trouble.
R.1785.

On or about December 16, 1985 Sear-Brown "loaned"

Johnson $365,000.

R.1788.

However, no security was given, no

interest was charged, and no demand for payment was ever made.
R. 1788, 1789; 1819.

In conjunction with that "loan," Sear-Brown

acquired 40% of the outstanding stock in Johnson.

R.1788.

On

January 26, 1986 two of Sear-Brown's officers and directors
joined Johnson's five member board.

R.1790, 1791.

On or about February 25, 1987, Sear-Brown acquired an
additional 26.6% of Johnson's stock, thereby increasing SearBrown's stock ownership to 66.6%.

R.1796, 1797. This additional

stock was purchased for $200,000. R.1796.

Sear-Brown retained

two seats on the Johnson board of directors that was reduced to a
total of four.

R.1797.

By April 15, 1988, Sear-Brown officers

and employees occupied three of the four Johnson board seats.

-;
Sear-Brown did not contest the directed verdict against
Johnson. Until the first morning of trial, however, Sear-Brown's
attorneys also represented Johnson.
s.\alr\56593
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R.1803.

At a Johnson board meeting on April 15, 1988, Mr. Jack

Johnson, the founder and president of Johnson company, was fired
by the Sear-Brown-controlled board.

R.1803, 1804,.

Mr. Johnson's termination was shortly followed by a lawsuit
by Mr. Johnson against Sear-Brown, and two lawsuits by Sear-Brown
and the Johnson company against Mr. Johnson and his wife.
R.1806; Exhibit 76.
On September 30, 1988 Sear-Brown entered into an agreement
settling the pending litigation with Jack Johnson and his wife,
Gloria.
(1)

R.1808; Exhibit 76.

That settlement agreement:

dismissed the pending lawsuits between Mr. & Mrs.

Johnson, the Johnson company and Sear-Brown;
(2)

conveyed the remaining Johnson company stock to Sear-

Brown, thereby vesting 100% of the Johnson stock in Sear-Brown;
(3)

obligated Mr. & Mrs. Johnson to pay Sear-Brown the sum

of $230,000; and
(4)

permitted Sear-Brown to use the Johnson name until

December 31, 1988.

R.1809; Exhibit 76.

The $230,000 was actually owed by Mr. & Mrs. Johnson to the
Johnson company, not to Sear-Brown.

Mr. Johnson's payment to

Sear-Brown of that $230,000 was therefore a transfer of a Johnson
company's corporate asset to Sear-Brown.

R.1810.

As of September 30, 1988 Johnson's liabilities exceeded its
assets by approximately one-half million dollars.
1887, 1888.
s \alr\56593

R.1816, 1817;

On October 1, 1988 Johnson, the company, ceased
4

operation.
R.2192.

Exhibit 67. Johnson no longer had any employees.

Commencing on October 1, 1988 and through February,

1989, all of Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown,
down to the last paper clip.

R.1814, 1815, 1829. Those

transfers were directed by Johnson's board of directors which
consisted entirely of officers or employees of Sear-Brown.
R.1868, 1869, 1878, 1879, 1885; Exhibit WW.

The transferred

assets included Johnson's personal property, accounts receivable
of $442,765.95, clients, and work in progress. R.1820-1823;
Exhibit 60.
Mr. Clary, Sear-Brown's president and a member of Johnson's
board, referred to the transfer of assets as an "acquisition by
default."

R.1881.

As early as January 1989, Sear-Brown's

stationary had a return address "Sear-Brown Group Resort Design
Division, formerly J.J. Johnson & Associates."

Exhibit 78. Mr.

Clary admitted previously describing the relationship as one of
"merger," (R.1827), although he declined to do so at trial.
R.1881.
The transfers included Johnson's assets and
R.1885.

liabilities.

According to Sear-Brown, it was owed some $797,000 by

Johnson as of September 30, 1988. R.1890; Exhibit 55. Some
$415,000 of the debt owed by Johnson to Sear-Brown was settled by
the transfer of assets.

R.1891, 1892; Exhibit 55.

Johnson's

"bad" accounts receivable that had previously been written off in
the amount of $364,000 were reinstated as income on Johnson's
s \alr\56593
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book (no cash was transferred), and transferred to Sear-Brown so
that Sear-Brown could take the loss.

R.1892; Exhibit 55.

No value was assigned by Sear-Brown to the client base or
work-in-progress it received from Johnson. R.1913.

There was no

attempt made to value the ongoing business of Johnson (R.1913),
even though Sear-Brown originally came to Utah to get into the
resort design business.

R.1718.

Sear-Brown is still in the

resort design business in Salt Lake. R.1913.
The $230,000 paid by Mr. & Mrs. Johnson under the
litigation settlement was paid directly to Sear-Brown instead of
through the Johnson company. R.1905.

That $230,000 payment went

toward recoupment of Sear-Brown's equity investment in the
Johnson company, not toward payment of any indebtedness. R.1906.
After the transfers to Sear-Brown and resolution of other
Johnson liabilities, the only

liabilities left with Johnson were

those owed to Selvage. R.1830, 1898, 1899.

On July 6, 1990,

Sear-Brown placed Johnson into bankruptcy. R.1828; Exhibit 67.
Johnson's Chapter 7 filing showed no ($0.00) assets, and listed
$332,000 in contingent liabilities owing to Selvage. R.1828,
1832; Exhibit 67.

In response to a bankruptcy petition question

regarding payments to "relatives" during the year preceding the
filing, Johnson responded "None."

R.2175, 2176; Exhibit 67.

Sear-Brown paid the costs and fees associated with Johnson's
bankruptcy (R.1828), and specifically timed the bankruptcy

s \alr\56593
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petition take advantage of statutes of limitations for avoiding
transfers. R.1878, 2182
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Sear-Brown admits that, unless a statute of limitation

bars Selvage's claim based upon "insider" transfers, it is liable
to Selvage.

Selvage's claim is not time-barred for the following

reasons:
a.

Sear-Brown did not properly plead the statute of

limitations defense;
b.

Sear-Brown cannot cure its failure to properly

plead by asserting that this is a jurisdictional issue;
c.

Sear-Brown's last minute motion for summary

judgment did not cure its failure to plead the statute of
limitations;
d.

Even if the statute of limitations was properly

pleaded, application of the discovery rule bars its
application;
e.

The asserted statute of limitations is not a

statute of repose and, even if it was, it is still subject
to the discovery rule.
2.

The appellant must marshal the evidence supporting the

findings in order to demonstrate that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient.

Sear-

Brown failed to marshal the evidence pertaining to the time
period during which the transfers from Johnson to Sear-Brown were
s \alr\56593
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made.

On this basis alone, Sear-Brown's appeal should be

dismissed.
3.

The evidence fully supports the jury's answers to

special interrogatories, and the lower court's findings, that
Johnson and Sear-Brown had the requisite intent to hinder, delay
or defraud Selvage.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5 is not simply a

restatement of common law fraud.

The jury was properly

instructed as to the statutory "factors" that may be considered.
Of particular relevance (not marshalled in Sear-Brown's brief)
was the transfer of $230,000 of Johnson assets on account of
Sear-Brown's stock interest in Johnson.
4.

The jury in this case was properly instructed.

Any

error in the instructions was immaterial and harmless because the
lower court adopted the jury's findings as its own.
5.

The doctrine of "mere instrumentality" is a basis for

holding one corporation liable for the debts of another
corporation that it totally controls and strips of assets to the
detriment of a creditor.

Selvage suffered such a loss and injury

due to Johnson's transfer of all its assets to Sear-Brown.

The

lead case of Turner from the Seventh Circuit has been cited with
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Omnico.
6.

Selvage is entitled to all his attorneys fees from

Sear-Brown under both the doctrine of mere instrumentality and
Utah's Fraudulent Transfers Act.

No allocation of fees was

required by failure of the alter ego theory because it did not
s.\alr\56593
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affect Selvage's presentation of evidence, right to judgment, or
amount of judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

SELVAGE'S "INSIDER TRANSFER" CLAIM WAS NOT TIME-BARRED AND
SEAR-BROWN ADMITS LIABILITY ON THE MERITS.
Appellant Sear-Brown does not dispute the merits of

Selvage's insider transfer claim under Utah Code Ann.
6(2).-7

§ 25-6-

Sear-Brown argues that this claim was time-barred under

§ 25-6-10(3).

The trial court, however, properly sustained

Selvage's claim by invoking the judicial discovery rules set
forth in Klinger

v. Rightly,

791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990).

Sear-Brown does not contend Selvage failed to actually
satisfy the Klinger

tests.

Sear-Brown's sole appeal is the

erroneous blanket contention that Klinger's

judicial discovery

rules can never be applied in any case to extend § 25-6-10(3).
As set forth herein, Klinger

can be applied in an appropriate

insider transfer case, so Selvage's judgment must be affirmed.
Before turning to the discovery rule, however, Selvage's
judgment must be affirmed because Sear-Brown never pleaded § 256-10(3) under Utah Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

9(h) A1

*
Sear-Brown Brief at 18: "It is undisputed that Johnson
Associate's transfers to Sear-Brown in partial satisfaction of
antecedent debts met the elements of insider transfers under Utah
Code Ann. § 25-6-6 (2) . ••
y
Because the trial court applied the discovery rule, it never
reached Selvage's argument under Rule 9(h). See R.00828.
s \alr\56593
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A.

Section § 25-6-10(3) Was Never Pleaded Under Utah R.
Civ. P. 9(h).

Sear-Brown's Answer only generally alleged that
"Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations."

The Answer never identified § 25-6-10(3), or any

other governing statute, and never indicated which of Selvage's
multiple claims were allegedly affected.

Rule 9(h) expressly

required Sear-Brown to plead its statute of limitations defense
by:
... referring to or describing such statute
specifically and definitely by section number,
subsection designation, if any, or otherwise
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently
clearly to identify it.
A century of rulings by the Supreme Court under Rule 9(h) and its
predecessors hold that Sear-Brown's failure to specify § 25-610(3) waived the benefit of that affirmative defense.
Wasatch

Mines

Co. v.

Hopkinson,

E.g.,

465 P.2d 1007, 1010-11 & n.5

(Utah 1970) .^
1.

Rule 9(h) Controls, Even If § 25-6-10(3) Is A
Statute of Repose.

Historical examination precludes Sear-Brown's contention
that Rule 9(h)'s reference to "statute of limitations" excludes

&

American

Theatre

Co.

v.

Glassman,

80 P.2d 922, 923-34 (Utah

1938)(pleading identified wrong statute, so defense was unavailable
in fraudulent conveyance action) ; In re Lindford's
Estate,
207 P. 2d
1033, 1034 (Utah 1949) (general allegation insufficient); NeldenJudsen

Drug

Co. v.

Commercial

(Utah 1903) ; Spanish
s:\alr\56593

Fork City

National

Bank

v. Hopper,
10

of

Ogden,

74 Pac. 195

26 Pac. 293 (Utah 1891) .

statutes of repose.-7 Rule 9(h) was adopted in 1950, and
E.g.,

restates more than a century of Utah law.
Utah § 3244 (1888).

Compiled

Laws of

In contrast, the Supreme Court's express

distinction between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation
apparently originated in 1985 with Berry
Aircraft

Corp.,

Ill

ex rel.

P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) .1J

Berry

v.

Beech

As recently as

1S84, the Supreme Court used "statute of limitation" and "statute
E.g.,

of repose" interchangeably.

Wholesale

Supply

Co.,

Compare

Perry

v.

Pioneer

681 P.2d 214, 216, 219 (Utah

1984)(referring to § 70A-2-725 both as a statute of limitation
and as a statute of repose) with

Bonneville

Investment,

Inc.,

Davidson

Lumber

Sales,

Inc.

v.

794 P.2d 11, 13 n.2 (Utah

1990)(carefully distinguishing § 70A-2-725 as a statute of
repose, even though it is frequently called a statute of
limitation) .-7

Section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of limitation, not repose, as
set forth in Selvage's argument on the discovery rule.
For
purposes of Rule 9(h), however, the distinction is immaterial.
1J

Berry

states that Allen

v.

Intermountain

Health

Care,

635 P. 2d

30 (Utah 1981) and Good v. Christensen,
527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974)
reviewed statutes of "repose". 717 P.2d at 683. Neither of those
cases, however, use the term "repose".
y

See also Peterson
v. Callister,
313 P. 2d 814, 815 (Utah
1957)(describing § 78-12-5.1 both as statute of limitation and as
a statute of repose); Good v. Christensen,
527 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah
1974)(incorrectly referring to § 78-12-25.5 as a statute of
limitation); Hirtler
v. Hirtler,
566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah
1977) (describing § 78-12-23 both as a statute of limitation and as
a statute of repose).
s \alr\56593
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Similarly, the Utah Legislature has historically used
"statutes of limitation" to refer to statutes of repose.
former Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-15-3(1), the quintessential statute of

repose reviewed in Berry;
Utah Code Ann.

E.g.,

title language in 1977 Utah Laws § 149;

§ 78-14-4 (medical malpractice statute of repose

entitled "statute of limitations").

The earliest instances

located by Selvage of the Utah Legislature actually using the
term "statute of repose" are the 1988 enactments of § 78-1233.5(1) and § 78-12-48(1) ("no statute of limitation or repose").
The foregoing historical background demonstrates that Rule
9(h)'s 1950 language of "statute of limitations" did not
distinguish between statutes of limitation and statutes of
repose, and must be read broadly to include both.
2.

Sear-Brown Cannot Avoid Its Failure to Properly
Plead by Characterizing § 25-6-10(3) as
Jurisdictional

Sear-Brown also contends that statutes of repose are
jurisdictional, and therefore cannot be waived, regardless of
Rule 9(h). No Utah case cited by Sear-Brown describes statutes
of repose in terms of "subject matter jurisdiction."-7
11

Sear-Brown's only cases mentioning "jurisdiction" concern

mechanics liens: AAA Fencing
714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986)

Mickelson,
Unlimited

802 P.2d 739
v. Copper

State

Co. v. Raintree
Dev. and Energy
and Diehl
Lumber
Transp.,
Inc.

(Utah App. 1990).
Thrift

& Loan Co.,

See also

Co.,
v.

Projects

798 P.2d 738, 751 n.13

(Utah 1990) which ruled that § 38-1-11 is a substantive restriction
on mechanics liens rather than a statute of limitations. Obviously,
after a lien has expired, there is nothing left for a court to
order foreclosed. None of these cases, however, describe § 38-1-11
(continued...)
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Accepting Sear-Brown's argument would allow any defendant to
assert any statute of repose for the first time on appeal,
thereby affecting such common litigation as sales disputes
(§ 70A-2-725) and medical malpractice (§ 78-14-1).
Nor does § 25-6-10 (3)'s language that "extinguishes" claims
make it jurisdictional.

Many affirmative defenses "extinguish"

claims,—7 but they must still be properly pleaded under Utah R.
Civ.

P. 8(c) % Sear-Brown's argument would excise all affirmative

defenses that "extinguish" claims from Rule 8(c) on
"jurisdictional" grounds.

Finally, Sear-Brown offers no policy

why statutes of repose should be treated as jurisdictional and
nonwaivable.
3.

Sear-Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment Did Not
Cure Its Defective Answer.

Sear-Brown argues that its motion for summary judgment,
filed one week before trial and heard on the first day of trial,
should be deemed to satisfy Rule 9(h). General notice of
potential affirmative defenses on the eve of trial, however, does
not satisfy Rule 8(c) or Rule 9(h).

-''(... continued;
as a statute of repose (or even mention statutes of repose) . Those
cases are simply not probative of the issues in this appeal.
w

See, e.g.,
Robinson
v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah
1979) (accord, "extinguishment"); State v. Masciantonio,
850 P.2d
492, 494 (Utah App. 1993)(payment, "extinguished"); Quealy
v.
Anderson,
714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 1986) (releases and accords,
"extinguish").
s:\alr\56593
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Sear Brown cannot take refuge in Utah R. Civ,

P. 15(b)

because it never moved to amend as that rule requires. SearBrown failed to move to amend during the 7 months between
Selvage's October 14, 1993 Memorandum raising Rule 9(h) (R.0828)
and the May 23, 1994 Amended Final Judgment.

Nor did Sear-Brown

make a post-judgment motion as permitted by Rule 15(b).
Any motion to amend under Rule 15 would have to have been
denied anyway.

Having delayed identifying which claim was

affected by which statute until the eve of trial, and having
admitted liability on the merits,—7 Sear-Brown could never
satisfy Rule 15(b)'s requirement that the "merits of the action
will be subserved thereby," or Rule 15 (a)'s condition of "when
justice so requires."
Co.,

See Goeltz

v. Continental

299 P.2d 832, 834-35 (Utah 1956); Staker

Cleveland

Irrigation

Co.,

Bank & Trust
v.

Huntington

664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983).

Sear-Brown's brief offers no reason to deviate from a
century of precedent strictly enforcing Rule 9(h). Any complaint
that Rule 9(h) is a technicality is overshadowed by Sear-Brown's
admission of liability "but for" the technicality of § 25-610(3)'s narrow one-year window.

Under competing technicalities,

the admitted merits must prevail.

—''
During argument on directed verdict (R.01979) Sear-Brown's
counsel stated: Section 25-6-10(3) "is one of the single most
important issues in this case, because if the plaintiffs are
permitted to go ahead under this status kind of claim, they, in
essence, win." See also Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellant at 18.
s:\alr\56593
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B.

The Trial Court Was Not Precluded From Applying the
Discovery Rule.

Even if Rule 9(h) is not dispositive, Sear-Brown's
arguments that the discovery rule should never be applied to
§ 25-6-10(3) are ill-founded.
1*

Statutory Construction of § 25-6-10 Does Not
Preclude Use of Klinger's
Judicial Discovery
Rules.

Section § 25-6-10 has three subsections setting limitations
periods for different types of fraudulent transfers.

Sear-Brown

is correct that § 25-6-10(1)'s express discovery rule for "actual
intent" cases precludes implying a statutory discovery rule for
insider transfer cases under § 25-6-10(3).

Sear-Brown's argument

is an incomplete, however, because statutory provision is only
one of three grounds in Klinger
Klinger

for invoking a discovery rule.

also provides a judicial discovery rule if warranted by

the particular facts of a specific case, i.e. where: (i) the
defendant engaged in concealment or misleading conduct, or (ii)
application of the general statute of limitation rule would be
"irrational or unjust" while the equities and prejudice weigh in
favor of the plaintiff.
McDonald,

791 P.2d at 872.

See also

Myers

v.

635 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah 1981).

Because Sear-Brown's brief never challenges Selvage's
satisfaction of Klinger's

criteria for invoking those judicial

discovery rules in this case, the judgment must be affirmed.
Moreover, the policies behind statutes of limitation are not
s:\alr\56593
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violated in this case because Sear-Brown's open admission of
liability on the merits resolves any issue of surprise or stale
evidence.
2.

Sear-Brown's Characterization of § 25-6-10(3) As A
Statute Of Repose Does Not Bar Application of
Klinger' a Judicial Discovery Rules,,

Sear-Brown argues (i) that § 25-6-10(3) is a statute of
repose, and (ii) that any discovery rule is antithetical to a
statute of repose.

Failure of either argument requires

affirmation of Selvage's judgment.
a.

Section 25-6-10(3) Is Not A Statute Of
Repose.

The distinguishing feature of a statute of repose is that
it commences from a date or event independent of the date the
legal injury occurs.

In comparison, a statute of limitations

runs from the date a cause of action arises.
v. Beech

Aircraft

v. Saab-Scandia

Corp.,
of America,

Berry

ex rel.

717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985);
Inc.,

Berry
Raithaus

784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah

1989).
Section 25-6-10(3)'s one-year period to file an insider
transfer claim runs from the date property is transferred.
claim under § 25-6-6(2) accrues on that same date.

A

The elements

of an insider transfer claim are: (i) the plaintiff was a
creditor "before the transfer" was made, (ii) the transferor "was
insolvent at the time" of the transfer, (iii) the transfer
satisfied an antecedent debt to the insider-transferee, and (iv)
s:\air\56593
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the insider-transferee already "had reasonable cause to believe"
the transferor was insolvent.

Because § 25-6-6(2) and § 25-6-

10(3) are triggered simultaneously, § 25-6-10(3) operates as a
statute of limitation, not as a statute of repose.
of Review

of

1992), cert,

Industrial

den.,

Avis

v.

Board

Comm., 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) (§ 35-1-99 is a

statute of limitation, not repose, because the limitation period
begins when the claim arises).
Sear-Brown wrongly reasons that § 25-6-10(3) is a statute
of repose because it "extinguishes" claims and UFTA Comment 9
says it is intended to "bar the right and not merely the remedy."
Sear-Brown's brief ignores the remainder of UFTA's Comment 9 and
UFTA's Prefatory Notes, however, which state that the legislation
creates "statutes of limitation."

7A Uniform

Laws Ann, Uniform

Fraudulent Transfer Act, at pp. 642 and 666.
No Utah case—7 makes the distinction that statutes of
limitation "bar" remedies while statutes of repose "extinguish"
claims.

Berry

uses the term "extinguish" to describe the

**'
Sear-Brown's citation to United States
v. Vellalos,
780 F.
Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1992) does not help its argument. First, the
Vellalos
court never refers to the Uniform Act as creating a
statute of "repose". Second, to the extent the Vellalos
court held
the statute's "extinguished" language was legally significant, it
also acknowledged it was diverging from rulings by the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits. Third, Vellalos
specifically noted that "the
United States does not claim that it could not have reasonably
discovered this recorded conveyance" by the statute's expiration
date, thereby suggesting that a judicial discovery rule could have
applied under the Uniform Act if the facts of the case warranted.
s \alr\56593

17

practical effect of a statute of repose expiring before a claim
arises, 717 P.2d at 684, but also states that the purpose of a
statute of repose "is to bar injured plaintiffs7 judicial
remedies."

Id.

at 673,

Any difference between Extinguish" and

"bar" is a red herring.—7
b.

Discovery Rules May Be Applied To Statutes Of
Repose.

Sear-Brown's argument that discovery rules are inherently
antithetical to statutes of repose is erroneous.

The Utah

Legislature has determined that statutes of repose and discovery
rules can coexist.

E.g.,

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 78-12-25.5

(improvements to real property); § 78-12-48 (asbestos); § 78-144(1)(a) (medical malpractice).

Sear-Brown even contradicts

itself by arguing that all of § 25-6-10 is a statute of repose,
while pointing out that § 25-6-10(1) contains a discovery rule.
Sear-Brown's argument that tolling provisions can never apply to
statutes of repose is also belied by Lee

v.

Gaufin,

867 P.2d 572,

589 (Utah 1993) (" § 78-12-36 operates to toll ... the
statute

of

repose

found in § 78-14-4(1)")(emphasis added);

four-year
Berry,

111 P.2d at n.9 (application of tolling provisions by Nebraska
court to statute of repose).

117

Cf. Berry,
111 P. 2d at 679, wherein the Supreme Court rejected
any constitutional significance of semantic distinctions between
"abrogating" a claim and defining a claim to be "temporally
limited."
s:\alr\56593
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The above examples illustrate that discovery rules and
other tolling provisions can coexist with statutes of repose.
contrast, Sear-Brown offers no policy reason why Klinger
never apply to such statutes.

In

should

Justice is obviously best served

by a judicial discovery rule in cases of concealment or
misleading conduct -- otherwise a statute of repose would
sanction such misconduct.

Similarly, no purpose is served by

barring claims when application of the general statute would be
"irrational or unjust" and admission of liability belies any
surprise or evidentiary prejudice.—7
Finally, Sear-Brown wrongly argues that Utah Code Ann.
§§ 68-3-1 and 68-3-2 prevent a court from applying common law
tolling principles to § 25-6-10(3).

Section 25-6-11, however,

expressly preserves and incorporates existing principles of law
and equity not specifically displaced by the Act.

E.g.,

UFTA's

Comment 10 states that under § 25-6-11 laches may bar an
otherwise timely claim.

If § 25-6-11 is broad enough encompass

laches, it is can also incorporate narrowly defined judicial
discovery rules.

Thus, even if judicial discovery rules are

inapplicable to most statutes of repose, § 25-6-11 expressly
preserves the courts' prerogative to apply Klinger,

when

~7
Sear-Brown also argues that applying judicial discovery rules
would be improper because § 25-6-6(2) is merely a "status-based
violation". That contention is erroneous because, in addition to
status, the statute also requires that the insider transferee "had
reasonable cause to the believe that the debtor was insolvent."
s:\alr\56593
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appropriate, to cases under § 25-6-10(3).

Sear-Brown's appeal

does not challenge Selvage's satisfaction of the

Klinger

criteria, so the judgment must be affirmed.
II.

SEAR-BROWN FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
The "clearly erroneous" standard governs appellate review

of the sufficiency of evidence supporting findings of fact.

A

finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence.
487 (Utah App. 1993).

Reinhold

v. Utah Fun Shares,

850 P.2d

The appellate court must review the

evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings
and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for doing so.
v. Gillmore,

745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied,

1278 (Utah 1988).

Gillmore
765 P.2d

The appellant must marshal all the evidence in

support of the findings in order to demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient.

Grayson

Roper

Ltd.

v. Finlinson,

782 P.2d 467

(Utah 1989).
Sear-Brown's "heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence was
recently examined by this Court in Oneida/SLIC
Storage,

v. Oneida

Cold

872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994):

To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate.
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order
to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty ..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports
the very findings the appellant
resists." [citations omitted]
s:\alr\56593

20

Once appellants have established every pillar
supporting their adversary's position, they then "must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those
pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. They
must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous,'"
[citation omitted]
Id.

at 1053.

This Court concluded:

This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that
appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases submitted on
disputed facts." [citation omitted] Accordingly, '[w]hen
the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse
to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and
accept the findings as valid." [citation omitted]
Id.

Sear-Brown did not attempt to marshal the evidence. SearBrown simply selected facts that support its position in an
attempt to reargue the case before this Court.

The most glaring

failure in this respect is Sear-Brown's refusal to discuss the
evidence of what occurred after September 30, 1988.

Selvage's

claims of fraudulent transfer and mere instrumentality did not
arise until September 30, 1988 when Sear-Brown acquired total
ownership and total control of Johnson, terminated Johnson's
business, and transferred all of Johnson's assets.

Selvage does

not claim, and did not claim at trial, that Sear-Brown did
anything improper before September 30, 1988.

It was the evidence

of events after that date that formed the basis and support of
the jury's and lower court's findings and judgment.
discussion of this evidence under III. infra,
29; 31-32.
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See

at pp. 20-22; 27-

Sear-Brown's failure to marshal the evidence regarding the
critical period after September 30, 1988, let alone portray it in
the light most favorable to Selvage, dictates dismissal of SearBrown's cross-appeal.
III. THE FINDINGS THAT JOHNSON AND SEAR-BROWN ACTED WITH ACTUAL
INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD SELVAGE WERE FULLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
Sear-Brown's brief attacking the jury's verdict and the
Court's findings rendered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-65(1)(a) (hinder, delay or defraud) disregards both the law and
the facts.

In short, Sear-Brown argues that this section is

nothing more than common law fraud.
Section 25-6-5 provides in part as follows:
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim
arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor, or ....
The point of inquiry goes to the intent of the
transferor.—7

This basis of liability is a creature of

statute, not of the common law.

Consequently, it does not

require findings on the various elements of common law fraud.
See

Linden

v.

Lewis,

Roca,

et

al,,

333 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1958).

&'
Johnson never appeared at trial to defend its intent. During
the pertinent period from the transfers through the trial, SearBrown controlled Johnson and could have caused Johnson to appear
and defend its intent. Indeed, Johnson shared .Sear-Brown's counsel
until the first day of trial.
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The elements of § 25-6-5(1) (a) are simply a transfer and the
proscribed intent.

In addition, the statute states in the

disjunctive the intent to hinder, delay, 2£ to defraud.

Courts

have recognized that each element of the hinder, delay or defraud
clause may independently supply a creditor with the elements of a
prima

facie

actual intent case.

Merely stalling for time at the

expense of one's creditors can violate the actual intent

provisions.

P. Alces, The Law of Fraudulent

Transactions,

1 5/03 [3] (1989) .
Section 25-6-5(2) lists several factors, "among other
factors," that may be considered when finding actual intent;
whether,
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or
concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's
assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent
shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred.
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly
after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an
insider of the debtor.
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In determining actual intent, it is not necessary that all
or even most of these factors be present.
Wilmouth,

726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).

See Dahnken,

Inc.

v.

Obviously, based upon the

language of 25-6-5(2), other factors may be taken into account by
the fact finder as well.
The jury was properly instructed regarding Section 25-65(1)(a) and (2). Instruction 29 (R.807) was a virtual quote of
the statute, including the listed nonexclusive factors.
The jury was then requested to answer two special
interrogatories, one going to actual intent to hinder or delay
(Special Interrogatory No. 2; R.820), and one going to actual
intent to defraud (Special Interrogatory No. 3; R.821).

The

unanimous jury answered both of these questions in the
affirmative.
As noted at the outset, Sear-Brown had a duty to marshal
all the evidence going to these questions, but only identified
selected portions.~7
cross-appeal.

That failure dictates a dismissal of its

However, without relieving Sear-Brown of its duty,

and Selvage cites the following illustrative evidence before the
jury:

W
Even the evidence identified in Sear-Brown's brief (pp. 28-31)
support the verdict, although Sear-Brown attempts to downplay its
significance.
s:\alr\56593

24

1.

The Transfer was to an Insider.

At the time of the

transfers, Sear-Brown owned 100% of the stock of Johnson.
R.1809.
2.

The Transfer or Obligation was Disclosed or Concealed.

Sear-Brown intentionally waited almost two years after the
transfers before placing Johnson in bankruptcy.

One of the

express reasons for this delay was to avoid applicable statutes
of limitation, including those of the Fraudulent Transfer Act.
R.1828, 1875; 2172, 2182. The transfers were not disclosed in
the bankruptcy schedules prepared for Johnson by attorney Curtis.
R.1829; 2175, 2176; Exhibit 67. Sear-Brown paid Curtis's fees
for preparing the schedules.
3.

R.1208-09; Exhibit 67.

Before the Transfer was Made or Obligation Incurred,

the Debtor Had Been Sued.

Johnson was sued by Selvage in the

spring of 1987. R.2-82. While the transfers were being made,
i.e., November 4, 1988, Selvage obtained summary judgment against
Johnson on the promissory note. R.145.
4.
Assets.

The Transfer was of Substantially All of the Debtor's
Between October 1, 1988 and February 17, 1989 all of

Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown.
5.

R.1814, 1815.

The Value of the Consideration Received by the Debtor

was Not Reasonably Eguivalent to the Value of the Asset
Transferred.

The jury was presented with evidence that Johnson

did not receive eguivalent value for its assets.

Sear-Brown

alleged a debt owed by Johnson of $797,000, and the transfer of
s:\alr\56593
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$415,000 in assets.

However, $365,000 of this "debt" was

accompanied by Sear-Brown's acquisition of 40% of Johnson's
stock.

The note supposedly reflecting this "loan" was never

demanded, interest was never charged and security was never
given.

R.1788, 1789, 1819.

The jury could infer that this was

not a loan, but rather an acquisition of stock: it was pointed
out that, two years later, Sear-Brown acquired another 26% of the
stock for $200,000. R.1796, 1797.
In addition, another $230,000 of the cash transferred to
Sear-Brown was admittedly applied to retire stock and had
absolutely nothing to do with repayment of debt.

R.1905, 1906;

Exhibit 55. At that time, § 16-10-42 (now repealed) provided
that distribution of assets to shareholders was allowed,
provided:

"No such distribution shall be made at the time when

the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would
render the corporation insolvent."

The $23 0,000 transfer to

Sear-Brown on account of a stock interest was, ipso

facto,

a

fraudulent conveyance and probative evidence that all the
transfers were made with proscribed intent.
No value whatsoever was assigned by Sear-Brown to Johnson's
transfer of its existing client base, bad receivables tax
write-off, or ongoing business contracts:

yet Sear-Brown

admitted its motive was to continue Johnson's resort design
business in Salt Lake City.
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was entitled to disregard Sear-Brown's valuations and was
justified in inferring intent to hinder, delay or defraud.
6.

The Debtor was Insolvent when the Transfers Occurred.

At the time of the transfers, Johnson's liabilities exceeded its
assets by the amount of $499,000. R.1887, 1888.
Considering these few listed statutory factors alone, there
is more than ample evidence of defendants' actual intent.

There

was substantial additional evidence of Johnson's intent to
hinder, delay and defraud Selvage, not the least of which was
Johnson's waiting almost six years before conceding its
obligations to Selvage at trial, and paying all other creditors
except Selvage.

From at least October 1988 onward, Sear-Brown

was in control of Johnson's efforts to avoid payment to Selvage.
With or without viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to Selvage, there is ample evidence of Johnson's intent
to hinder, delay or defraud Selvage, as well as Sear-Brown's
complicity.

The record precludes overturning the jury's verdict

and the trial court's independent finding.
IV.

INSTRUCTIONS 34 AND 35 WERE PROPER, OR HARMLESS ERROR.
A.

Sear-Brown's Objections To Jury Instructions Were Not
Preserved.

Sear-Brown placed certain objections to the jury
instructions into the record (R.02060-61) shortly before the
instructions were read to the jury, but neither the trial judge
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nor Selvage's counsel was present.—7

Selvage was thereby

deprived of the opportunity to address those objections.

More

importantly, the private oration neither requested the court, nor
gave it any opportunity, to correct any perceived error before
the jury retired to deliberate.

Objections serve no purpose if

not brought to the Court's attention, and are not for solely
setting up an appeal.

See Hill

v.

Cloward,

377 P.2d 186 (Utah

1962) .
In addition, the overly general and broad objections read
into the record (R.02060) are inadequate to preserve the
objections for appeal.

Beehive

Medical

Electric,

Inc.

v.

Square

D Company, 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983).
B.

The Jury Was Correctly Instructed.

Sear-Brown's brief (p.28 and pp. 2-3) erroneously
challenges Instructions 34 and 35 with respect to finding actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.

Instruction 35

(R.816), however, was correctly taken from the Utah Corporations
Code—7 which prohibits an insolvent

corporation from

distributing assets to its shareholders on account of their

stock

111

The transcript (R.02059A-61) does not expressly reflect who
was present. It does show, however, that the objections were not
acknowledged by the judge or Selvage's counsel. Selvage does not
expect Sear-Brown to deny that its objections were read to the
reporter in private. Selvage's counsel did notice Sear-Brown's
private statements to the reporter by chance, but only in time to
hear the last few sentences.
—7 Section 16-10-42, as effective on the date of the transfer, now
repealed.
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interests.

That instruction of statutory law was specifically

warranted by admissions in Sear-Brown's trial testimony that

interests.

That instruction of statutory law was specifically

warranted by admissions in Sear-Brown's trial testimony that
$230,000 of Johnson's assets were transferred on account of SearBrown's "investment" and "not a repayment of debt." (Exhibit 55;
R.01905-06, emphasis added).

Sear-Brown's acceptance of

transfers on account of its equity investment was significant
evidence of actual intent to hinder and defraud, and was not a
"mere preference."

The jury could also infer that the $365,000

unsecured, no interest, "loan" was actually equity.
Similarly, Instruction 34 (R.815) states that the fiduciary
duty of directors of an insolvent

corporation shifts from the

stockholders to creditors, and that the directors cannot prefer
themselves or other creditors.

Under the Corporations Code, the

duty of the directors in distributing assets clearly shifts to
creditors ahead of stockholders.

With respect to preferring

Sear-Brown as one creditor over Selvage, the transfer (on the
date thereof) was specifically proscribed by Utah Code § 25-66(2).

Hence, Selvage's Proposed Additional Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order (R.01297) to the trial court stated:
Under the Utah Corporations Code and the Utah
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Instructions 34 and 35 were
properly given in the context of this case. While Utah
law does not per se prohibit preferential transfers,
such transfers are avoidable when they violate the
specific provisions of the Utah Corporation Code and
the Fraudulent Conveyance [sic Transfer] Act.
(Emphasis added).

Shortly thereafter, the trial court issued it

April 14, 1994 Findings and Conclusions (R.01293), agreeing that
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"Instructions 34 and 35 were properly given in the context of
this case."

(Emphasis added).

The trial court was correct.

Even though general preferences to outside creditors may not be
voidable, the jury wrestling with Sear-Brown's actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud Selvage was entitled to know that this
particular transfer was statutorily proscribed on the date it was
affected.

Even if the preference claim under § 25-6-6(2) was

time-barred, its statutory proscription at the time of transfer
was material to the jury's determination of actual intent under
§ 25-6-5(1) (a) . See also

§ 25-6-5(2) (a) .

Moreover, Sear-Brown's brief omits the fact that
Instruction No. 28 expressly instructed the jury that a transfer
"is not fraudulent merely because the transferor prefers one
creditor over another", and that Johnson's transfer to Sear-Brown
"was not fraudulent merely because the company had insufficient
assets to pay all creditors, including the plaintiffs." (R.806).
Sear-Brown's suggestion that the jury ignored those express
instructions is without foundation.

The instructions must be

read as a whole, and Sear-Brown's reference to Instruction Nos.
34 and 35, without Instruction No. 28, misstates the record.
C.

Any Error In Instructions 34 and 35 Were Immaterial and
Harmless.

Ultimately, the judgment below was rendered on the findings
and conclusions of the trial

court,

not on the jury's verdict.

The January 13, 1994 Memorandum Decision stated, "The foregoing
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Findings of Fact were triable by the jury.

To the extent any of

the foregoing Findings of Fact were issues for the court, the
court adopts the findings of the jury as its own."
(R.01130)(emphasis added).

In a later hearing, the trial court

described the jury in this case as "advisory."—7
That ruling by the trial court itself, and the treatment of
the jury as advisory, moots Sear-Brown's appeal on the jury
instructions.

Even if Instructions 34 or 35 could have confused

a jury, prejudicial error does not occur when the jury is (or is
treated as) advisory.
1975).

See a2so Romrell

392 (Utah 1980).

Kesler
v.

v. Rogers,

Zions

First

542 P.2d 354 (Utah
National

Bank,

611 P.2d

While Sear-Brown's brief (p.28) contends that a

jury may have been confused by Instructions 34 and 35, Sear-Brown
never attempts to argue that the trial court failed to keep
separate its respective analyses of the insider preference claim
and the claims for actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud.
V.

JOHNSON WAS THE MERE INSTRUMENTALITY OF SEAR-BROWN WHEN
SEAR-BROWN STRIPPED JOHNSON OF ITS ASSETS.
Sear-Brown is liable for Selvage's judgment and claims

against Johnson because, at the time all the assets of Johnson
were transferred to Sear-Brown, Johnson was a mere

w

Hearing of May 11, 1994 (R.02154-55). Selvage contends that
all issues were triable by the jury because a money iudgment was
sought, and briefed that issue to the trial court. (R.00875-880).
Nevertheless, given the trial court's independent concurrence with
the jury's findings in all respects, the proper role of the jury in
this case is moot.
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instrumentality of Sear Brown,.
Aeronautical

Corp.,

Steven v. Roscoe

324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963), cited with

approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Chatterly
P.2d 667, n.3 (Utah 1971).
Corp.,

Turner

In Bernardin,

v. Omnico,

Inc.

485

v. Midland

Oil

520 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1975), the court restated the

well-established principle of law that "the parent corporation
will be responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary
when...the subsidiary has become its mere instrumentality."

Id.

To establish liability through the mere instrumentality
theory, three elements must be proved.

First, the parent must

control the subsidiary "to such a degree that the subsidiary has
become its mere instrumentality."

Id.

at 774.

Second, the

parent must have perpetrated a wrong through its subsidiary such
as by "stripping the subsidiary of its assets."

Id.

Finally,

there must be an element of "unjust loss or injury to the
claimant, such as insolvency of the subsidiary."
Kelley

v.

American

Precision

Industries,

(Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1983); CM Corp.

v.

F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1980); Northern

Energy

Leasing

Corp.,

Inc.,
Oberer

Id.

See

also

438 So.2d 29, 31
Development

Illinois

Gas Co.

Co.,
v.

631
Total

502 F.Supp. 412, 416 (N.D. 111. 1980).

The record fulfills each of those elements:

Sear-Brown had

total control of Johnson on the transfer dates, Sear-Brown
committed a wrong by stripping Johnson of its assets, and that
wrong unjustly injured Selvage because it left Johnson with no
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assets and no ability to pay its liabilities to Selvage.

These

three elements will be discussed in detail.
A.

Control.

Courts applying the mere instrumentality

theory have listed several elements that indicate control of a
subsidiary.

The "proper combination" of these factors is

controlling; each of them need not be met.
Gas,

502 F.Supp. at 419.

Northern

Illinois

As of the transfer dates, ten of the

most relevant factors were clearly present:—7
(1)

"The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital
Turner

stock of the subsidiary."

Aeronautical,

324 F.2d at 161.

When Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown, Sear-Brown
owned all of the stock of Johnson.
(2)

"The parent and subsidiary corporations have common

directors or officers."

Id.

At the time of the transfer, all

the directors of Johnson were agents of Sear-Brown.
(3)

"The parent corporation finances the subsidiary."

Id.

Sear-Brown had financed Johnson through a "loan," stock purchase,
and settlement agreement.
(4)

"The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital

stock of the subsidiary...."

Id.

At the time of the asset

transfer, Sear-Brown owned all of Johnson's stock.

^7
The factors indicating control are quoted here from
Turner
Aeronautical,
324 F.2d at 161. Turner Aeronautical's recitation of
these factors has been generally adopted by courts considering this
theory. See Bernardin,
520 F.2d at 775; OJberer Development, 631
F.2d at 539.
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(5)

"The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital."

Id.

From the moment of Sear-Brown's first involvement, Johnson was
undercapitalized.

Sear-Brown took all of Johnson's assets by

assignment, leaving it without any capital at all, without any
business operation, and ultimately in a liquidating Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
(6)

"The parent corporation pays the salaries and other

expenses or losses of the subsidiary."

Id.

During the transfer

period all of Johnson's liabilities were paid, with the simple
exception of the liabilities to Selvage.

During the transfer

period, Johnson had no employees.
(7)

"In the papers of the parent corporation or in the

statements of its officers, the subsidiary is described as a
department or division of the parent corporation, or its business
or financial responsibilities referred to as the parent
corporation's own."

Id.

Prior to the asset transfer, Sear-Brown

told the media that the Sear-Brown Group, Inc.'s relationship
with Johnson was one of "merger."

In January 1989, Sear-Brown

used letterhead describing itself "formerly J.J. Johnson and
Associates."

At trial, Sear-Brown's president described an

"acquisition by default."
(8)

"The parent corporation uses the property of the

subsidiary as its own."

After September 30, 1988 Sear-Brown

treated all of Johnson's assets as its own.
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(9)

"The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not

act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take
their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's
interest."

Id.

The directors and officers of Johnson acted in

the interest of Sear-Brown rather than Johnson.

Johnson's

directors and officers stripped Johnson of all of its assets to
pay Sear-Brown (some on account of stock rather than debt),
waited a year to avoid preferential transfer liability, then put
Johnson in Chapter 7.

These actions of Johnson's officers and

directors can hardly be characterized as "act[ing] independently
in the interest of" Johnson.
(10)

See

id

"The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary

are not observed." Id.

Sear-Brown admitted taking some of the

transfers on account of stock rather than debt.
Those ten factors are manifestly sufficient to support the
finding that, at the time of the asset transfers, Sear-Brown had
complete control to the point that Johnson had become its mere
instrumentality.

See Northern

Illinois

Gas,

502 F.Supp. at 419 &

n. 12 (not all factors need be present to support finding of
control; nine out of eleven is sufficient); Bernardin,
at 775 (eight is enough).

520 F.2d

Thus, the first prong of the mere

instrumentality theory was supported by the evidence in this
case.
B.

Wrong by Stripping Assets.

The second prong of the

mere instrumentality theory is the presence of a "fraud or wrong
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by the parent through its subsidiary, e.g., torts, violation of a
statute or stripping the subsidiary of its assets."
Aeronautical,

324 F.2d at 160 (emphasis added).

prong of the test is met in this case.

Turner

Obviously, this

By the time Sear-Brown

was finished with Johnson, everything from work in progress to
paper clips had been stripped clean.
C.

Unjust Loss or Injury.

The final prong is "unjust loss

or injury to the claimant, such as insolvency of the subsidiary."
Id.

(emphasis added). Johnson's insolvency is undisputed, and

Johnson's bankruptcy petition listed its assets at zero.

As part

of the asset stripping, Sear-Brown received at least $230,00 on
account of its stock investment.

In contrast, Selvage as a

creditor received nothing.
The facts of this case squarely fit the legal requirements
for the application of the mere instrumentality theory.

At the

time of the asset transfers which created the wrong (i.e., asset
stripping), and during the bankruptcy which created the unjust
loss to Selvage, Sear-Brown was in complete control of Johnson.
In the factually similar case of Bernardin
Corporation,

v. Midland

Oil

520 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1975), the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the following
conclusion:
The question then becomes, against whom should judgment be
entered? Midland [the parent corporation] and Zestee [the
subsidiary] are both corporations, but all of Zestee's
stock is owned by Midland...The evidence introduced at the
trial of this cause demonstrates that Zestee is no longer a
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viable corporation. Midland, as the sole shareholder,
directed one of its own officers to collect the insurance
proceeds and sell the assets of Zestee. This was done, and
the cash received on liquidation of the assets has been
paid to other creditors. To permit Midland to escape
Zestee's creditors by retaining Zestee as a shell would
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Factors such as the
stock ownership and the decision to liquidate and maintain
a shell establish a situation where the corporate veil
should be pierced...Therefore, the Court finds that Midland
and Zestee are in essence one and the same, and that each
[is] liable for the amount due Bemardin.
Id.

(quoting the opinion of the district court).
That passage from Bemardin,

with a few name changes, could

have been written about the case before this Court.

Sear-Brown,

as the sole shareholder of Johnson, directed its officers, who
also were officers of Johnson, to liquidate Johnson's assets and
pay them to itself and to Johnson's other creditors with the sole
exception of Selvage.

This left Johnson as an empty, bankrupt

shell from whom Selvage could get no satisfaction on his
contractual claim or his judgment.

Sear-Brown's "stock ownership

[of Johnson] and the decision to liquidate and maintain a shell
establish a situation where the corporate veil should be
pierced."

Id.

Therefore, just as the Bemardin

court found, the

jury and trial court were justified by the evidence in finding
Sear-Brown and Johnson were "in essence one and the same and that
each [is] liable for the amount due" Selvage.

Id.

Sear-Brown argues that the jury's responses to Special
Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 7 (R.824, 825) under Instruction 36
(R.817) on alter ego somehow absolved it of liability under mere
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instrumentality.

Jury Instruction No. 33 (R.814) separately

advised the jury of the mere instrumentality doctrine, and
Special interrogatory No. 5 (R.823) separately asked the jury
whether "at the time the assets were transferred" Johnson had
become a mere instrumentality of Sear-Brown, whether Sear-Brown
stripped Johnson of its assets, and whether this created an
unjust loss or injury to Selvage.

The unanimous jury said

Unlike the mere instrumentality directions, the instruction
and special interrogatory on alter ego did not direct the jury to
"the time the assets were transferred, or, for that matter, to
any time period."

Rather blatantly, Sear-Brown's evidence and

argument explicitly dealt only with the period before the
transfers occurred.

Perhaps the best example of this dichotomy

was Sear-Brown's counsel's statement to Sear-Brown's president,
Mr. Clary, while inquiring into the association between Johnson
and Sear-Brown:

—7 Although not addressed in Sear-Brown's brief, the jury reached
its verdict in light of Instruction No. 32 (R.811) which required
the jury to find "total domination" before it could find Sear-Brown
liable under the mere instrumentality doctrine. Instruction No. 32
specified facts which "standing alone" would not establish
sufficient control. (See also Instruction No. 27, R.805). Thus,
the jury was appropriately instructed. Moreover, at trial, SearBrown objected to Instruction No. 33 on the basis that the mere
instrumentality doctrine is not a basis for liability, Jbut SearBrown did not object to kow Instructions
Nos. 32 and 33 were worded
and put to the jury.
See R.2060.
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Q.
Prior to the time the assets were
transferred ~- and all my questions are directed to
this -- did Sear-Brown, for example, impose its
vehicle policy on J.J. Johnson and Associates?
(R.1873)(emphasis added).
Later in the testimony, Sear-Brown's counsel inquired of
Mr. Bruce Erickson as to his employment by Johnson.

But again

these questions only went through September 30, 1988, before any
transfers occurred and before Sear-Brown had total control of
Johnson.

On cross-examination, Mr. Erickson admitted that during

the period of transfers, he was an employee of Sear-Brown (rather
than of Johnson).

R.2192, 2193.

Special Interrogatory No. 5 and Instruction No. 33 for the
mere instrumentality theory on which Selvage prevailed were both
expressly directed to the period when the

transfers

occurred.

In

contrast, neither Instruction No. 36 nor Special Interrogatories
Nos. 6 or 7 on alter ego directed the jury to the period when the
transfers occurred.

Based on the different time periods and

cases presented, the verdicts and court findings on alter ego and
mere instrumentality were not inconsistent or contradictory.

The

jury and court found that during the pre-September 30, 1988
period that Sear-Brown's counsel tried, Johnson was not SearBrown's alter ego.

Separately, the court and jury found that

during the post-September 30, 1988 period that Selvage's counsel
tried, Johnson was Sear-Brown's mere instrumentality.
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VI.

SELVAGE IS ENTITLED TO ALL OF ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AGAINST
SEAR-BROWN
Sear-Brown's brief does not dispute the reasonableness or

amount of Selvage's attorneys fees, but rather only challenges
Selvage's entitlement to any attorneys fees.

During seven and

one-half years of litigation, Selvage incurred substantial legal
fees in first pursuing breach of contract claims against J.J.
Johnson, and then pursuing those same claims against Sear-Brown
under mere instrumentality and fraudulent transfer.
Pursuant to the three contracts that were conceded at trial
to have been breached, Selvage is entitled to attorneys fees
incurred in any action "brought for the enforcement of [the
agreements], or because of an alleged dispute, breach, default or
misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of the
[the agreements]."

Sear-Brown incorrectly argues that liability

for fees is limited to Johnson on the contract claims and does
not extend to Sear-Brown.
Selvage is entitled to have his attorneys fees awarded
against Sear-Brown, because:
•

Recovery under the mere instrumentality doctrine
(Special Interrogatory No. 5) places Sear-Brown
directly in Johnson's shoes.

Sear-Brown therefore is

directly and contractually liable for those fees.
•

Independently, Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act, makes
Sear-Brown statutorily liable for "the amount necessary
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to satisfy the creditor's [Selvage's] claim11 against
Johnson.
added).—;

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(2) (emphasis
Selvage's claim against Johnson includes

his attorneys fees, and was less than the amount of the
fraudulent transfers.

See Id.

Moreover, given

Johnson's fraudulent transfers of all its assets, the
costs of prosecuting the fraudulent transfer claim were
"necessary to satisfy" Selvage's claim.
In W. Marvin
Association,

Inc.,

Radney,

et al. v. Clean Lake Forest

Community

681 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.App.Ct. 1984), the court

awarded attorneys fees for both the underlying claim and
establishing a fraudulent transfer.

Radney involved a violation

of a restrictive covenant for which a statute provided for
attorneys fees.

Just prior to trial, the defendant conveyed the

subject property to a third party.

The trial was continued to

allow the plaintiffs to join the transferee of the property and

—
Counsel for Sear-Brown argued below that if the actions
against Johnson and Sear-Brown had been separate, entitlement to
attorneys fees would have been terminated at the conclusion of the
case against Johnson. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Fees incurred in collection or satisfaction of a judgment are also
recoverable. This is recognized not only by § 25-6-9(2), but also
by Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration [attorneys'
fees affidavits] which provides for the following language in
default judgments:
"And it is further ordered that this judgment shall be
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by
execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit."
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to state claims under the fraudulent conveyance act.

The jury

found that the conveyance was intended to "hinder or delay"
plaintiffs from obtaining the requested relief.

Attorneys fees

were awarded against both the transferor and the transferee.
On appeal, the defendants argued that plaintiffs had to
distinguish between the attorneys fees incurred on the fraudulent
conveyance cause of action and those incurred on the underlying
action on the restrictive covenant.

Rejecting this argument, the

court ruled as follows:
Appellants believe that, under the statute, appellees could
not recover for legal services rendered in relation to the
fraudulent conveyance cause of action. We disagree.
The statute allows the recovery of attorney's fees in
an action based on a restrictive covenant. We believe that
the fraudulent conveyance action was in part based on and
related to the breach of the restrictive covenant. The
home had been conveyed by appellants, shortly prior to
trial, to a foreign corporation. In order to obtain the
complete relief to which they were entitled because of the
breach, it was necessary for appellees to have the
fraudulent conveyance voided. The fraudulent conveyance
action would not have been necessary if appellants had not
conveyed the property in order to avoid the suit to enforce
the restriction. In this situation, the entire suit was
based on the breach of the restriction.
681 S.W.2d at p. 199 (emphasis added).
Sear-Brown's citation to Cottonwood

Mall

P.2d 266 (Utah 1992) is not to the contrary.

Co. v. Sine,
Cottonwood

830
Mall

stands only for the proposition that a request for fees must
distinguish between work that was subject to a fee award and work
that was not:
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"One who seeks an award of attorney fees must set out the
time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for which
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement to attorney fees."
at. p._269, 270.

Cottonwood

Mall does not address whether fees

incurred in avoiding a fraudulent transfer in satisfying a breach
of contract claim are recoverable.

Thus, there is simply no

inconsistency between Radney and Cottonwood Mall.

Radney

addresses the question of what fees are recoverable; Cot tonwood
Mall addresses the question of allocation if. it has already been
determined that all fees are not recoverable.
After trial, both the jury and the court found for Selvage
on every theory except alter ego.

(Unconscionability was

originally pleaded but not litigated.)

That unsuccessful alter

ego theory, however, involved the same operative facts, evidence
and damages that were actually awarded under the successful
theories of mere instrumentality and fraudulent transfer. Hence,
failure of the alter ego theory did not require allocation of
fees as contended by Sear-Brown because it did not affect the
presentation of Selvage's case, Selvage's right to judgment, or
the amount of judgment.

Furthermore, to the extent the jury did

not award one item of damage that was claimed under all of his
theories (compare Instruction No. 26, R.804 with Interrogatory
No. 1, R.819), Selvage offered to put on testimony for any needed
allocation.
s:\alr\56593

The trial court, however, ruled without granting the
43

requested hearing.

(The effort to claim that single damage item

represented less than l/10th of 1% of the fees incurred.)
Selvage's request-for, and right to, that hearing are discussed
in his opening brief.
Sear-Brown speculates that the trial court cached the
grossly reduced fee award of $42,500 by estimating the amount
expended by Selvage on the contract claim alone.

That

speculation, however, does violence to the actual judgment that
both Johnson and Sear-Brown are liable for the $42,500 fee award.
Particularly in light of the trial court's failure to enter
findings and conclusions on the fee award, the only reasonable
interpretation of the trial court's rulings is that Selvage's
$175,000.00 fee request was slashed to $42,500 for unexplained
reasons.

See Regional

Sales

1210 (Utah App. 1989), vacated

Agency,

Inc.

on other

v. Reichert,
grounds,

784 P.2d

830 P.2d 252

(Utah 1992) same counsel; same judge; same reduction).
RELIEF SOUGHT
Sear-Brown's cross-appeal on liability should be dismissed.
The attorneys fee portion of the judgment should be remanded in
the manner requested in Selvage's opening brief.
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ADDENDUM

46
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Tab A

Rule 9. Pleading special matters

(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute
of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of
the statute relied on, referring to or describing such
statute specifically and definitely by section number,
subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to
identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the
party pleading the statute must establish, on the
trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so
barred.

TabB

Jury Instruction 2Z*

The jury is instructed that defendant J. J. Johnson &
Associates failed to appear in this lawsuit and failed to mount a
defense in this lawsuit.

The court, therefore, directs that

defendant J. J. Johnson & Associates is liable to plaintiffs for
breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Independent Consulting
Areement, and the Addendum to the Independent Consulting
Agreement.

It is, however, within the province of the jury to

determine the amount of damages to be awarded plaintiffs arising
from defendant J. J. Johnson & Associates breach of those
agreements.
The court also wishes to inform the jury that counsel
for Sear-Brown did not represent J. J. Johnson & Associates in
this lawsuit and is in no way responsible for the court's entry
of a directed verdict as to J. J. Johnson £ Associates liability
for the breach of the agreements.
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Jury Instruction

2<b

The plaintiffs claim that as a result of the
defendants' failure to perform the defendants obligation under
the contract, the plaintiffs suffered loss in one or more of the
following respects:

UNPAID TIME AND EXPENSES UP TO FEB. 1, 1987

$22,015.82

ADDITIONAL UNPAID REIMBURSEABLES / COSTS
AFTER FEB.l, 1987

$ 1,865.50

BALANCE OF UNPAID CONSULTING AGREEMENT:
CONSULTING SERVICES
FIVE MONTHS RENT
FIVE MONTHS OFFICE EXPENSES
SIX MONTHS MED. INSURANCE

$37,500.00
$ 2,500.00
$ 2,500.00
$ 1,500.00

UNPAID ASSET PURCHASE NOTE

$25,000.00

UNREIMBURSED AUGUST EXPENSES

$ 9,650.00

LOSS ON SALE OF IBM STOCK

$22,500.00

TAXES ON STOCK "GAIN"

$ 7,000.00
TOTAL

$132,031.32

00804

11
Jury Instruction *~'
The degree to which a parent owns stock in its
subsidiary or shares officers or directors with it, or files a
joint tax return, or loans money to the subsidiary do not, in and
of themselves, defeat the separate existence of the corporations
so as to allow a parent corporation to be held liable for the
debts of a subsidiary.

00805

Jury Instruction

A transfer of property is not fraudulent merely because
the transferor prefers one creditor over another.

In this case,

the transfer of J. J. Johnson & Associate's assets to the SearBrown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates was not fraudulent
merely because the company had insufficient assets to pay all
creditors, including the plaintiffs.

It is not the intent of the

fraudulent transfer laws to provide equal distribution of the
assets to creditors nor to compel a debtor to choose among its
creditors.
This general rule does not apply, however, if the
transfer was a fraudulent transfer.

0080G

Jury Instruction

2q

Under the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a
transfer of assets from a debtor corporation is fraudulent if it
is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the transfer
was made with actual intent to hinder or delay any creditor of
the debtor corporation, or when it is shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the transfer was made with actual intent
to defraud any creditor of the debtor corporation.
_To ^determine whether the transfer was made with "actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud," consideration may be given,
among other factors, to whether:
A.

;S

B.

V

/

the transfer was to an insider (for purposes of
the Utah Fradulent Transfer Act, the term
"insider" includes any shareholder who owns 2 0% or
more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, or a corporation in control of the
debtor);
the debtor retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer;
the transfer or obligation was disclosed or
concealed;

y--\

D.

before the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened
with suit;

\/-\

E.

the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's
assets;

F.

the debtor absconded;

G.

the debtor removed or concealed assets;

H.

the value of the consideration received by the
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of
the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;

?
"^

00807

I.
^

^ '

J.
M c
K.

\;
tv*

the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent
shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred;
the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly
after a substantial debt was incurred; and
the debtor transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to
an insider of the debtor.

Not all of these factors need to be present to prove
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.

These factors are

only guidelines, and you may consider other factors present in
the case.

CC8C8

Jury Instruction 31/

Under the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a
transfer of assets from a debtor corporation is fraudulent if it
is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
- the assets were transferred to an insider for the
purpose of satisfying a debt which the debtor owed to the insider
(for purposes of the Utah Fradulent Transfer Act, the term
"insider" includes any shareholder who owns 20% or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, or a corporation in
control of the debtor corporation);
- and that, at the time the assets were transferred,
the debtor was insolvent;
- and that the insider reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.
For purposes of this instruction, a debtor is
"insolvent" if, at the time of the transfer, the debtor's
liabilities exceeded its assets.

00809

Jury Instruction

If a transfer is found to be fraudulent under the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the plaintiff may recover
damages from the transferree up to the amount of the value of the
assets which were transferred.
For purposes of setting a value on the assets that were
transferred, you may include the transferor's physical assets,
cash, work in progress, accounts receivable, good will, and
client lists.

00810

Jury Instruction

Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group may be
held liable for the debts of J. J, Johnson & Associates, if you
find that it misused J. J. Johnson & Associates by treating it,
and by using it, as a mere business conduit for its own purposes.
In making the determination of whether Sear-Brown Associates
and/or Sear-Brown Group are liable to the plaintiff, you must
consider two elements.
First, did Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown
Group control J. J. Johnson & Associates to the degree necessary
to make J. J. Johnson & Associates a mere instrumentality as
defined in these instructions, and
Second, Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group
must have proximately caused plaintiff harm through misuse of
that control.
The fact that Metro Equipment held an ownership
interest in J. J. Johnson & Associates does not, standing alone,
resolve the question of whether Sear-Brown Associates and/or
Sear-Brown Group had control of J. J. Johnson & Associates.
Similarly, the fact that a creditor/debtor relationship
existed between J. J. Johnson & Associates and Metro Equipment
and Sear-Brown Associates does not, standing alone, constitute
control necessary to establish liability.
Generally, the mere loan of money from one corporation
to another does not automatically make the lender liable for
actions and omissions of the borr^w^r.
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In order for Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown
Group to be liable for the debts or obligations of J. J. Johnson
& Associates, you must find proof that Sear-Brown Associates
and/or Sear-Brown Group assumed actual, participatory, total
control of J. J, Johnson & Associates; its merely taking an
active part in the management of J, J. Johnson & Associates does
not automatically constitute such control.
The degree of control required before Sear-Brown
Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group can be found liable for the
debts or obligations of J. J. Johnson & Associates amounts to
total domination of J. J. Johnson & Associates, to the extent
that J. J. Johnson & Associates manifests no separate corporate
interest of its own and functioned solely to achieve the purposes
of Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group.

nnfii 9

Jury Instruction

-2 ~'
^

A successor corporation is liable for the debts and
obligations of a predecessor corporation if it is shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the predecessor corporation
was a "mere instrumentality" of the successor corporation and
that the successor stripped the predecessor of its assets,
causing an unjust injury or loss to the plaintiff.
A predecessor corporation is the "mere instrumentality"
of the successor if it is shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that, at the time of the asset transfer, that most, but
not all, of the following factors were present:
A.

That the successor corporation owned all or most
of the capital stock of the predecessor
corporation; /-c-

B.

That the two corporations had common directors or

officers; ^c^u.
C.

That the successor corporation financed the
predecessor corporation;
M,^

D.

That the parent corporation subscribed to all the
capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise
caused its incorporation; ~pt j

E.

That the predecessor corporation had grossly
inadequate capital so that it was unable to
continue operation;/^c^

P.

That the successor corporation paid the salaries
and other expenses or losses of the predecessor
corporation;
^ ^

G.

That in the statements and writings of the
successor corporation's officers, the predecessor
corporation was described as a department or
division of the successor corporation or the
predecessor corporation's business or financial
responsibilities were referred to as belonging to
the successor; w/!

,/

' /

'

C

That the successor used the property of the
predecessor as its own; Bcad,xJl^
That the executives of the predecessor did not act
independently rr\ Thr iniiapnndenH-y in the interest
of the predecessor, but rather took their orders
from the successor, ^^i/^
J.J. Johnson had substantially no business except
with the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown
Associates or no assets except those conveyed to
it by the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown
Associates, JJ

nnoi A

Jury Instruction

-* '

When a corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary
duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the
creditors of the corporation.

When a corporation becomes

insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and directors
no longer represent the stockholders, but by the fact of
insolvency, become trustees for the creditors.

The officers and

directors of the insolvent corporation cannot by transfer of the
corporation's property prefer themselves or other creditors.

n n o % e:

Jury Instruction

A corporation may not distribute all or a portion of
its assets to shareholders, on account of their stock interests,
if the corporation (i) is then insolvent, or (ii) would thereby
be rendered insolvent.
A corporation's distribution of assets to shareholders
on account of their stock interest during insolvency is a
fraudulent transfer.

nnfiifi

Jury Instruction
Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and
distinct entity from its stockholders.

This is true whether the

corporation has many stockholders or only one.

Consequently, the

corporate veil which protects stockholders from liability for
corporate debt will only be pierced reluctantly and cautiously.
To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable
"alter ego" doctrine, two circumstances must be shown:
1.

Such a unity of interest and ownership that

the separate personalities of the corporation and the
shareholder(s) no longer exists, but the corporation
is, instead, the alter ego of its stockholder(s); and
2.
a fraud,

If observed, the corporate form would sanction
promote injustice,

or

result in an

inequity.
The plaintiff need not prove actual fraud, but must only show
that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in an
injustice.
Certain factors are deemed significant, but not
conclusive, in determining whether the foregoing test has been
met, including:
a.

undercapitalization of a one-man corporation,

b.

failure to observe corporate formalities,

c.

nonpayment of dividends,

d.

siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant
shareholder,

e.

nonfunctioning of other officers or directors,
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f.

the use of the corporation as a facade for
operations of the dominant stockholder or
stockholders,

g.

the use of the corporate entity in promoting
injustice or fraud.
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F!LErPSVR5CTC05JRT
TrjtrcJ Judicial District

OCT 0 8 1993
Special Interrogatory
Li vAlt&CUui

By.

Opfijt" C»r*

Indicate the amounts, if any, of damages you find
plaintiffs incurred as a result of J. J. Johnson & Associates'
breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Independent
Consulting Agreement and its Addendum.
A.

UNPAID TIME AND EXPENSES UP TO FEB. 1, 1987:

B.

ADDITIONAL UNPAID REIMBURSEABLES &. COSTS
AFTER FEB. 1, 1987

C.

$ $2 C/S~ - # <L

$JM£-I-£L

BALANCE OF UNPAID CONSULTING AGREEMENT:

CONSULTING SERVICES
FIVE MONTHS RENT
FIVE MONTHS OFFICE EXPENSES
SIX MONTHS MED. INSURANCE
D.^ UNPAID ASSET PURCHASE NOTE

$

\

/Tcr

rr^

$ <7£5T rr

E.

UNREIMBURSED AUGUST EXPENSES

F.

LOSS ON SALE OF IBM STOCK

G.

TAXES ON STOCK "GAIN"

$ / ^ X . tor$ lf<?</r<T. J£

TOTAL DAMAGES:
DATED this S

A'I

day of October, 1993.

wfr<fr<A
Foreperson

f^V^.

7^
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Special Interrogatory

Was it shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the transfer of J. J. Johnson & Associates' assets to Sear-Brown
was made with actual intent to hinder or delay any creditor of J.
J- Johnson & Associates?

Yes

A

No
DATED this %t,f

day of October, 1993

^Foreperson

00820

Special Interrogatory

Was it shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the transfer of J.J. Johnson & Associates' assets to Sear-Brown
was made with actual intent to defraud any creditor of J.J.
Johnson & Associates?

Yes

x

No

DATED this

8*

C~~ day of October, 1993

Foreperson

Special Interrogatory

iL

Was it shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
- the transfer of J. J. Johnson & Associates, Inc.'s
assets to Sear-Brown was made for the purpose of satisfying a
debt which J. J. Johnson & Associates, Inc. owed to Sear-Brown;
-and, at the time the assets were transferred, SearBrown was an insider of J.J. Johnson & Associates, Inc.,
- and, at the time the assets were transferred, J. J.
Johnson & Associates, Inc. was insolvent (its liabilities exceed
its assets);
- and, that Sear-Brown had reason to believe that J. J.
Johnson & Associates, Inc. was insolvent at the time of the
transfer?

Yes

A

No
DATED this < ^ '

day of October, 1993

"Foreperson

Special Interrogatory
Was it shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the following factors were present?
1.

That at the time the assets were transferred,
Sear-Brown controlled J.J. Johnson & Associates,
Inc. to such a degree that J.J. Johnson &
Associates, Inc. had become a mere instrumentality
of Sear-Brown.

2.

That Sear-Brown stripped J.J. Johnson &
Associates, Inc. of its assets.

3.

That this created an unjust loss or injury to
plaintiffs by making J.J. Johnson & Associates,
Inc. insolvent.

Yes

A

No

DATED this

n^

day of October, 1993

JM^^^/Z^L
Foreperson

Special Interrogatory

Was it shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
J. J. Johnson & Associates was the alter ego of Sear-Brown and
that observation of the corporate distinction between J. J.
Johnson & Associates and Sear-Brown would sanction a fraud, or
promote injustice, or result in an inequity?

Yes

No
DATED this # -

*

day of October, 1993

Foreperson

Special Interrogatory

7

Please answer the following questions based on a
preponderance of the evidence, unless otherwise indicated.

If

you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue
presented, answer "Yes.11

If you find the evidence is so equally

balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented, answer "No."
Taking into consideration all the evidence in this
case, which if any, of the following propositions have been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence?

If a matter has been

proven, answer "Yes," if it has not been proven, answer "No."
a) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates
owned all or most of the capital stock of J. J.
Johnson.
Yes:

£±

No:

b) The Sear-Brown Group or Sear-Brown Associates
employed common directors or officers with J. J.
Johnson.
Yes:

X

No:

c) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates
financed J. J. Johnson.
Yes:

/^

No:

d) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates
created or caused the incorporation of J. J. Johnson.
Yes:

No:

/\
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e) J. J. Johnson had grossly inadequate capital during
its affiliation with the Sear-Brown Group and/or SearBrown Associates.
Yes:

/\.

No:

f) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates
paid the salaries and other expenses or losses of J. J.
Johnson.
Yes:

No:

/X

g) J. J. Johnson had substantially no business except
with the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates
or no assets except those conveyed to it by the SearBrown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates.
Yes:

No:

£±

h) In the papers of the Sear-Brown Group and/or SearBrown Associates, J. J. Johnson was described as a
department or division of the Sear-Brown Group and/or
Sear-Brown Associates.
Yes:

No:

^

i) The directors and executives of J. J. Johnson did
not act independently in the interest of J. J. Johnson
but took their orders from the Sear-Brown Group and/or
Sear-Brown Associates*
Yes:

No:

/_

00826

j) The formal legal requirements of J. J. Johnson were
not observed.

Yes:
DATED this

ft Mtf No:
!(4

8^

day of October, 1993.

Foreperson
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25-6-1

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review.—The Doctrine of Part
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contract* in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance ft 19, 20.

CJS. — 61 CJS. Specific Performance
| | 44, 45.
Key Number*. — Specific Performance e»
39 et esq.

25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be subscribed
by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party.
History: R.S. 1898 * CX. 1907, I S478;
CJL 1917, I 5825; R.S. 1933 A C. 1943,
33-5-9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Authorization from only one joint tenant
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint
tenant, by contract to purchase the common
property since she had not signed the contract

nor given written authority to agent to sign for
her. William* v. Singleton, 723 P26 421 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 379 et aeq.

Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of e»
116(1).

CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Frsudulent transfer — Claim arieing before or after transfer.
Frsudulent transfer — Claim ariaing before transfer.

Section
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.

Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief — Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
25-6-12. Construction of chapter.
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter.

25*6-1. Short title.
This chapter ia known aa the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act."
History: C. 1953, 25A-M, enacted by L.
19S8, eh. 69, I 1; recompiled aa C. 1953,
2S-6-1.
Comparable Provisions. — Other juhsdictions thst hsve adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act include: Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota,

Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Okiehome, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was ediacted as if 25A-1*1 to 25A-1-13; it has been
renumbered and all internal references corrected accordingly under instruction from the
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25-6-2

FRAUD

Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Datee. — Laws 1986. Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1966, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Croes-References. — Uniform Commercial
Code — Sales, I 70A-2-101 et eeq.

Uniform Commercial Code — Bulk Transfers, I 70A-6-101 et eeq.
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor,
I 764-511.
Statute of limitations, f 7S-12-26X3).

25*6*2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to
vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the
securities:
(i) as afiduciaryor agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are
controlled by the debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against
only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who i§ liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor,
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
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(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(a)(ii); or
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or
person in control;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor,
(ii) an officer of the debtor,
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(b)(iv); or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person
in control of the debtor,
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor,
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a
person in control of the debtor,
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a genera] partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(c)(iii); or
(v) a person in control of the debtor;
(d) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were
the debtor; and
(e) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a
spouse, related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined
by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) 'Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
Hiitory: C. 1953, 25A1-2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, f 2; recompiled at C. 1953,
25-6*2.

Effective Dates. — Lews 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,19SS, pursuant to
Utah Const., An. VI, Sec. 25.
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FRAUD
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ality to as to reach all artifices and evasions
designed to rob the act of it* full force and effect in preventing debtors from paying the just
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson,
740 ?M 1244 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Creditors.
Construction tad application.
latent.
Creditor*.
Persons having claim in tort against grantor
which was not reduced to judgment at time of
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditor"
within meaning of this taction. Zuniga v.
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 46 PM 513, 101 AJLR.
532 (1935).

Intent
Where debtort engaged in a Pouri scheme,
the debtors'fraudulentintent was established
as a matter of law, notwithstanding the bankruptcy trustee'! burden of proving each element of a fraudulent conveyance by clear and
convincing evidence under this chapter. Mer
rill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co.), 77 Bankr 843 CD. Utah 1987).

Construction and application.
This section should be construed with liber-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Bankrupt's
Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bank*
ruptcy Drams, 1974 Utah L Rev. 709, 722.
AJLR. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent where made in contemplation of possible
liability for, 38 A.L.R3d 597.
Rule denying recovery of property to one who
conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable
where the claim which motivated the conveyance was never established, 6 AXJt4th 862.

Right of secured creditor to have eet aside
fraudulent transfer of other property by his
debtor, 8 A.L.R 4th 1123.
Conspiracy, right of creditor to receiver damages for conspiracy to defraud him of claim, 11
AXJUth 345.
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances

e»6.

25*6*3. Insolvency.
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all
of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is
presumed to be insolvent.
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the
partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general
partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts.
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under
this chapter.
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is
secured by a valid lien on property of* the debtor not included as an asset.
History: C. 1*53, I S A - l * enacted by L.
IMS, ch. 69, I 3; recompiled at C. 1963,
25*3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sac 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
. . .
tion
Allegation oT insolvency
Determination of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient
at against contention that it was a conclusion,
Zumgs v Evans, 87 Utah 198.48 ?M 513,101
AJLR. 532 (1935)
Determination of insolvency.
The determination of insolvency under this
eection is not the same as the determination of

ineolvency inthebaiikniptcyeenae,ejthiseecrequire* merely a showing that the party's
l i i t t I ^ ^ ^ ^ t to mmt u&Qton „
^ y hmam d u e M f y t r v 0 f | | t r i l ^
^ ^
569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
In an action by a creditor to set aside an
allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate
by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate
that the debtor was insolvent where the only
evidence was that the debtor submitted two
checks that were returned unpaid Furniture
Mfri Sales, Inc. v. Oeamer, 680 PJd 898
(Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Imputation of insolvency as de*
fematory, 49 AX.R.3d 163.

Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
e» 67(1).

25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured
or satisfied However, value does not include an unperformed promise made
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support
to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in (act
substantially contemporaneous.
History C. 1953, 25A1-4, enacted by 1*
Effective Dates. — Laws 1986, Chanter 59
1986, ch. 59, f 44 recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on Ann) 25,1988, pursuant to
85*4.
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
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(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(0 the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became effective on April 25,1968, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors
as a misdemeanor, f 76-6-511.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, dcAssignments
U y o r d e f r a u d creditors, or was made for such
Badges of
fraud^
purpose, depends upon the facts and circumConstruction and application.
£ered^ from
surrounding
the transaction,
gaththe badges
of fraud as
present.
Constructive
trust
••
0
tWtB
Boccalei
EvIdewT " ^^^
^ '
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063
(1942).
Fair consideration.
-Good faith" transfer.
Badges of fraud.
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Although actual fraudulent intent must be
Parent and child.
shown to hold a conveyancefraudulent,its exAssignmenU.
iatence may be inferred from the pitsence of
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, un- eeruin indicia of fraud or "badges offraudw
accompanied by change of possession, is fraud- Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
ulent per se as to execution creditors of, or sub* (Utah 1986).
aequent purchasers from, seller or assignor
"Badges offraud,"fromwhich actual intent
does not necessarily apply to assignments for may be inferred, include, inter aha. a debtors
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking (1) continuing in possession and evidencing the
possession is circumstance from which fraud prerequisites of property ownership after havmay be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Mur- ing formally conveyed all his interest in the
dock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899).
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipaA
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tion of litigation, and (3) making a conveyance
to a family member without receiving fair consideration Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726
?2d 420 (Utah 1986).
Construction and application.
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor
from paying or securing his honest debts, or
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his
creditors by placing his means at their dieposal Billing! v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P.
730 (1898).
Constructive trust
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase pnce, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent convey*
ance to a third-party purchaser for value with*
out notice could not be voided Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Conveyances between relatives.
Conveyances between near relatives, calculated to prevent a creditorfromrealizing on his
claim against one of such relatives, are subject
to rigid scrutiny Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah
540, 15 P2d 1051 (1932)
The mere fact that the transaction is among
close relatives does not necessarily mean that
it is invalid, but the true facts are subject to
proof Given v Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351
P2d 959 (1960)
A note and mortgage executed by eon in good
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent
conveyance Ned J Bowman Co v White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962)
Conveyances between close relatives are
subject to ngid scrutin>, but the fact that close
relatives are involved does not render the conveyance fraudulent Ned J Bowman Co v.
Whit*, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Evidence.
Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate «as in good faith and not to hinder, delay or defraud creditors depends upon the facta
and circumstances surrounding the transaction, as gathered from the badges of fraud
present Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126
P.2d 1063 (1942)
In an action on notes executed by the defendants and to establish a lien on property conveyed by one of the defendants to his children,
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the lower
court's findings that the conveyances were not
fraudulent and to sustain a judgment denying
a hen Given v Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,351
P.2d 959 (1960)
Whether a conveyance M fraudulent aa to
creditors must be determined from the facta of
etch case and from the arcumstanees surrounding the transaction, keeping in mind that

25-6*5

the purpose of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(now ate the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act) is not to prevent a debtor from aacunng
his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White,
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Fair ooneideratiozL
Where there ia a valuable oonaideration
which is stated to be fair, equivalent for, and
not disproportionate to the value of the property conveyed, the requirement aa to allegations and proof of fraud is more exacting.
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244,17 ?M 264
(1932).
Where wife owned a substantial interest in a
Joint bank account and husband executed a
note to the wife at her request upon withdrawing a substantial sumfromsuch account to invest in a hazardous business, and whan it became due, husband executed renewal note secured by mortgage on undivided one-half interest in property owned by them jointly, the original interest note was supported by valuable
oonaideration, and, hence, the mortgage waa
sot fraudulent as to creditors Williams v. Fttenon, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935).
Conveyance of property worth $14,000 to
815,000, which netted only about $180 a year,
to party in aatiafaction of preexisting debt of
$10,000 was not a fraudulent conveyance.
Utah Assets Corp v. Dooley Bros. Aae'n, 92
Utah 577, 70 PJM 738 (1937).
A debt barred by the statute of limitations
may nevertheless be oonaideration for the assignment of an interest in an estate, even aa
between close relatives Boccalero v. Bee, 102
Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942).
In suit to aet aaide conveyancefromhusband
to wife, no actual fraudulent intent will be required, when there was no fair value or consideration given, and the effect of the transfer is
to render the grantor insolvent Cardonv Harper, 106 Utah 560,151 ?M 99,154 AXJI 906
(1944).
A conveyance was not made in good faith,
and there was a failure of fair consideration,
where purchaser knew that the purchase price
of an item was approximately only one-tenth
the value of the item Meyer v General Am.
Corp, 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
Satisfaction of an obligation owed the transferee by a third party did not qualify as fair
consideration
under
former
I 25-1-4.
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1966).
An otherwise fraudulent tranafer ia not
made nonfraudulent because transfer is made
to satisfy a third party's obligation to the
transferee even if the thirty party ia a corporation aet up by the transferor Dahnken, Inc. v.
Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
"Good faith" transfer.
Proof that a transferee of property knows
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that the transferor-debtor has preferred the
transferee over other creditors or that the
transferee actively sought the preference from
the debtor does not support the conclusion that
the transferee lacks good faith under former
I 25-1*7. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1987).
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Mortgage on stock of merchandise was
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mortgagor, where mortgagor remained in possession of mortgaged property and continued to
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee,
which agreement contemplated that mortgage

was not to be paid on ita due date but waa to be
extendedfromtime to time McKibbon v. Brigham, 18 Utah 78, 55 P. 66 (1898).
Parent and child.
Labor performed for parents by children during their minority will not entitle such childrtn
*° «>ap*&**tion, so as to establish relation of debtor and creditor asid permit parenu
lawfully to prefer children, o>nvey their proptrtv
*° tilfm » and thus plans property out of
reach of parents' creditors whose claims were
"> existence at time of deed's execution. Ogden
State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765
(1895).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJLR. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudu- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
lent where made in contemplation of possible e» 24(2), 71, 76(1).
liability for, 38 A.L.R.3d 597.

25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before transfer.
( D A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time; or
(b) the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for
an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
History: C. 1953, 23A1-6, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 69, I 6; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-6.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1968, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Mortgage.
A mortgage made without fair consideration,
which will render the person making it ineolvent, constitutes statutory fraud, and the axis-

tenet of a subjective intention to defraud if not
required. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
e» 74(1).
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25-6-7. Transfer — When made.
In this chapter:
(1) A transfer is made:
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected
that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against
whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the
transferee; and
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a
fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than under this
chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in
Subsection (1) and the transfer i§ not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed
made immediately before the commencement of the action.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as
provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective
between the debtor and the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the
asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred:
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the
obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.
Hiftoiy: C. 1953, 25A1-7, enacted by L.
1988, cb. 59, I 7; recompiled a* C. 1953,
25-6-7.
Effective Datea. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became tfltctive on April 25,19S6, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.
Croat-References. — Secured transactions,
Chapter 9 of Title 70A.

25-6-8. Remedies of creditors.
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to
satisfy the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its
proceeds.
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History: C. 1953, 25A14, enacted by L.
IMS, ch. 6t\ t 6; recompiled as C. 1963,
18*64.

Effective Dates. — U w i 1968, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Garnishment proceeding.
Pleadings.
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Garnishment proceeding.
Fact that pleadings in garnishment proceedings revealed that indebtedness sued upon was
that of individuals and that those individuals
had no account with garnishee bank, the only
account being with corporation owned by individuals, did not make cause of action one, under this section, to set aside conveyance, and
thus argument that court had never obtained
jurisdiction of corporate defendant or of res
since no service of summons was made upon
corporation could not be maintained; the pleading sufficiently averred a sham transaction between the individuals and the corporation so
that they should be considered as identical for
purpose of garnishment proceedings. Stine v.
Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959).
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnishment proceeding, and it was not necessary to
file a separate action to obtain such relief.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236
(1974).
Pleadings.
Allegations in an action to set aside convey-

ances that the conveyances were made for the
purpose of placing the property beyond the
reach of creditors and were made as part of a
scheme, without s statement of the facta from
which the purpose could be inferred, and without stating facts constituting the scheme,
amounted to no more than the mere statement
that the conveyances were fraudulent. Smith
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
Complaint in an action to set aside a conveyance was not objectionable for failure to allege
that the property involved in the conveyance
was not exempt. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,
48 P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Where grantees were in possession of premises pursuant to a duly recorded deed and were
paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent upon
plaintiffs, in an action to set aside conveyance,
to allege and prove that grantees as such did
certain acts held themselves out in s way that
misled plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowledge and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards, 81
Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show
that property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed is not exempt from execution.
Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560,151 P.2d 99,
154 A.L.R. 906 (1944).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
e» 217, 226 et aeq.

25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a)
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted, under
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who
took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the
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asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may
require.
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb) or Section
25-6-6 if the transfer results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9,
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a
valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business of financial affairs of the
debtor and the insider; or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an
antecedent debt of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-19, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 59, I 9; recompiled as C. 1953,
254-9.

Effective Dates. — Lsws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1986, pursuant to
Utah Coast., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consideration
Constructive trust
Good faith
Previous notice of fraud.
Purchaser.
Consideration.
The term "consideration" as used in former
I 251*13 includes both a conveyance of "property" and satisfaction of an antecedent debt.
Merrill v Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co), 77 Bankr 843 (D Utah 1967).
An investor in a Ponu scheme fave "valuable consideration" for the transfers he received to the extent the transfers did not exceed his undertaking, but did not give valuable
consideration for a tnntftr to the extent the
transfer exceeded the amount of his undertaking Therefore, for such transfers, former
I 25-1-13 was no defense Merrill v. Abbott (In
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr.
843 (D Utah 1987).
Constructive trust
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds

from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase price, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent conveyance to a third-party purchaser for value without notice could not be voided Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 ?2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Good faith.
A conveyance will fail for lack of "fair coneideration" if the party seeking to avoid the
conveyance can ahow that the transferee did
not take "in good faith * Merrill v. Abbott (In
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr.
843 (D. Utah 1987).
Previous notice of fraud.
The mere fact that an investment promises
to pay a high rate of return may not, without
more, put one on notice that it i$ fraudulent.
Therefore, that fact alone may not mean that
the investors in a Ponxi scheme had previous
notice of the debtors' fraud, especially when
the debtors actually paid the promised returns
until the scheme collapsed Merrill v. Abbott
(In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77
Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1967).
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Purchaser.
The term •'purchaser* at used in former
I 25-1-13 includes anyone who acquire* title to

property through a voluntary transfer Memll
v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing Houae
Co.), 77 Bankr. $43 (D. Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Number*. — Fraudulent Conveyances
e» 192.

25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits.
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or
obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought:
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after
the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered
by the claimant;
(2) under Subsection 25-6*5(1 Kb) or 25-6-6(1), within four years after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
^ ^ (3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was
i^^nade or the obligation was incurred.
History. C. 1953, 25A-M0, enacted by L.
1988, eh. 59, i 10; recompiled as C. 1953,
254-10.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1968, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., ArL VI, Sec. 25

25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including
merchant law and the law relating to pnncipal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's provisions.
History: C. 1953, 25A-M1, enacted by L.
1988, cb- 59, I 11; recompiled aa C. 1953,
25-6-11.

Effective Date*. — Lewi 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on Apnl 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25*6-12. Construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among
states enacting it.
History. C. 1953, 25A-M2, enacted by L.
1968, eh. 69, I 12; recompiled aa C. 1953,
254-12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.
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25-6-13** Applicability of chapter.
This met applies when'any transfer occurs after the effective date of this act
History: C. IMS, 25A-M3, enacted by L.
1SSS, ch. 59, I IS; racompflad as C. 1*53,
2&4-13.
Compiler's Notes. — Tht tsnn t h i s act"
man* Laws 19S6, Chaptar 59, which appsars
as If 25-6-1 to 25-6*13, 7S-12-25, and

7*42-29, end which was afieetfo April 25,
193S. The rsfsrsnes probably thould bt to t h i s
chaptar"
Effective Data*. — Laws 19SS, Chaptar 59
became affactivs on April 25,19SS, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VL Sac. 25.
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